Isabella Tabarovsky in The Tablet reveals what I wasn’t aware of, but does not surprise me in the least. Not only had UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim much more of a Nazi past than he ever admitted to (that’s public knowledge by know) but the USSR and its intelligence services leveraged what they did know to the hilt to turn him into… a Soviet asset.
https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/history/articles/moscow-man-united-nations
Read the whole thing — but here is a taste.
Few stories better capture the moral bankruptcy of an institution born from the ruins of World War II and the Holocaust than the Soviet quid-pro-quo relationship with Waldheim as its head. Years after his decade as the United Nations’ chief ended, the world learned that Waldheim had lied about his wartime past. A little later, it would emerge that Moscow had likely known all along.
Waldheim always claimed that his service in the Wehrmacht was brief and had ended when he was wounded on the Eastern Front in late 1941, after which he returned home, pursued legal studies, and got married. In fact, he had returned to the front in 1942 and served out the rest of the war as an intelligence officer in the Balkans: first in Yugoslavia during brutal Nazi massacres and anti-partisan reprisals, then in Salonica during the deportations of the city’s Jews to Auschwitz. It also turned out that before the war, in Vienna, Waldheim was a member of the National Socialist German Students’ League and the Sturmabteilung—the infamous Brownshirts. A later commission concluded that he did not personally take part in the atrocities in the Balkans, but his lack of embarrassment at being exposed as a liar and his insistence that he had seen and known nothing beggared belief—all the more so because his immediate superior, Gen. Alexander Löhr, was a convicted war criminal executed by the Yugoslavs in 1947.
From the moment he moved into his office on the 38th floor of the Glass Building—the U.N. headquarters housing its administrative arm, the Secretariat—Waldheim proved unmistakably subservient to Moscow. With him at the helm, the Soviets expanded their intelligence footprint at the Secretariat, planting hundreds of additional KGB agents under diplomatic and bureaucratic covers. Under his watch, they completed a mission they had begun years earlier: turning the United Nations into a weapon in their long-running campaign to pit the world against Israel—America’s main ally in the Middle East—and Zionism, which, especially after 1967, the Soviets regarded as a major ideological threat. Observers took note of Waldheim’s spinelessness. By 1978, French intelligence had concluded that Waldheim was “an agent of influence under Soviet control.”
For the Soviets, eventual revelations about Waldheim’s Nazi past were, in all likelihood, old news. For them, he had been a known quantity since 1947, when he spent a month in Moscow as part of the Austrian delegation negotiating the country’s sovereignty, as the World Jewish Congress’s Eli Rosenbaum—a former federal prosecutor who would later lead the Department of Justice’s Nazi-hunting unit and who revealed Waldheim’s Nazi past in 1986—detailed in his book Betrayal. Stalin’s intelligence services would have pored over every detail of his biography in search of compromising information, both as a matter of their invariable practice and because a Nazi past was a dream piece of leverage to have over upwardly mobile Europeans.
Decades later, former Yugoslav intelligence officers told The Washington Post that they had marked Waldheim as a potential recruit for Moscow in 1947, the same year he traveled there, while his former wartime commanding officer faced a firing squad in Yugoslavia. They were certain the Soviets had followed through—a suspicion indirectly reinforced two decades later, during the Prague Spring, when Waldheim, now Austria’s foreign minister, ordered the country’s Prague embassy to bar entry to Czechs who were being hunted by Soviet security forces. The ambassador disobeyed, but the gesture would not have gone unappreciated in Moscow.
[…]
The most vivid account of how the Soviets weaponized the United Nations against the West comes from Arkady Shevchenko’s memoir, Breaking With Moscow. Shevchenko was the ultimate Soviet insider; he was a protégé of Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, and his big break came at the age of 29, when he accompanied Premier Nikita Khrushchev on his visit to the United Nations (a journey complete with 10 drunken days aboard the decrepit, storm-tossed passenger liner Baltika sailing from Kaliningrad to New York). In 1973, after several tours of duty at the United Nations, Moscow recommended him to Waldheim for the post of undersecretary-general for political and Security Council affairs. The appointment placed Shevchenko in a position second in power only to the secretary-general himself. Disillusioned with the corrupt and oppressive Soviet system, he began cooperating with American intelligence and in 1978 defected to the United States—the highest-ranking Soviet diplomat to do so up to that point.
For Moscow, Shevchenko wrote, the United Nations was the “best watchtower on the West.” It was a great place to collect political and technical intelligence—but that was only part of the story. As Waldheim’s undersecretary, Shevchenko was responsible for using the Secretariat “to widen the scope of Soviet ideological and propaganda warfare” within the organization. That meant ensuring that nothing “detrimental to Soviet interests” ever appeared on the United Nations’ agenda or in its studies or reports.
The converse was true as well: He was to make sure that favorable information was included, whether it was true or not. His other duties included promoting KGB undercover agents to more influential posts, protecting them if the CIA or FBI got on to them, and “indoctrinating” non-Soviet staff into a pro-Soviet point of view. He was also tasked with working with newly independent, postcolonial member states to make sure they didn’t fall under the influence of Western “bourgeois ideology” but aligned themselves with Moscow and its “progressive ideas.”
The KGB had penetrated the United Nations long before Waldheim rose to the top. Shevchenko recalled that out of 28 men who worked in his section of the Soviet mission in 1968, 21 were KGB or GRU (military intelligence) officers. Other nations planted spies at the United Nations as well, he noted, “but the Soviet Union had the largest contingent and the most thorough penetration of the organization.”
The KGB installed countless agents in influential positions across the Secretariat. One served as a trusted personal assistant to the secretary-general, often traveling to American universities in his U.N. capacity on KGB assignments. Another held the key strategic post of director of external relations, crafting United Nations’ communications strategy and press releases and mingling with American intellectuals and financiers at prestigious conferences. KGB officers in the personnel office scanned job applications for “exploitable weaknesses” and rerouted “promising” candidates to a senior KGB recruiter, also implanted at the United Nations, Shevchenko wrote. After 13 years on the job in New York, the recruiter was transferred “to an equally strategic personnel post in Geneva, overseeing hiring and promotion in the U.N.’s European headquarters.” Western protests failed to put an end to this.
Again, read the whole thing — it[‘s well worth your time. One more quote:
Why didn’t the Americans go to bat for [opposing candidate] Jakobson? In Rosenbaum’s view, they might have fallen victim to a lack of imagination. In Washington’s eyes, the organization was useless and ineffectual, so it didn’t ultimately matter who headed it. What they failed to appreciate, he noted, was how “even a politically powerless head of an impotent international organization could provide important intelligence assistance” to America’s foreign adversaries.
One person who did grasp the broader implications of Soviet ideological subversion of the United Nations was Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who served as the U.S. ambassador when the “Zionism is racism” resolution was adopted (and was privy to Shevchenko’s collaboration with U.S. intelligence). In a 1977 essay for Commentary titled “The Politics of Human Rights,” Moynihan explained how the Soviet-led process of isolating Israel at the United Nations was a proxy for “a more generalized effort to deprive the democratic nations of their legitimacy as democracies.” The anti-Zionist venom that the USSR and its client states normalized at the United Nations went hand in hand with the tactic of turning the tables on the democratic West in matters of human rights. “The charge could range from genocide to unemployment,” Moynihan wrote, “but it always followed the Orwellian principle: hit the democracies in the one area where they have the strongest case to make against the dictatorships.”
Tonight is Yom Kippur. Gmar chatima tova — may you be sealed in the Book of Life.







